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The fiduciary duty of good faith, now set forth in section 172 of the Companies Act 
2006, expressly positions shareholders at the centre of the company’s interests, and 
assigns the priority entitlement to shareholders relative to all other stakeholders.  The 
provision constitutes an attempted codification of the common law duty to act in good 
faith in the corporate interest, which remains immensely important in interpreting and 
applying the modern good faith requirement.  However, this article submits that a 
reductive shareholder-determined articulation of the pre-2006 corporate interest 
seems practically misconceived, if not indeed in some sense conceptually impossible 
as a managerial behaviour obligation, and represents a departure from the common 
law that is problematic for contemporary English company law and policy.  Instead, 
the article provides a more functional and nuanced understanding of the salient cases, 
which focus typically on the company as a body corporate, and the particular free 
floating commercial objects of that entity.   
 
KEYWORDS: Directors’ duties; corporate objective; corporate governance 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The nature of the fundamental and enduring debate about the precise goals and 
responsibilities of company directors and officers has been clear for some time.1 The 
almost uniform view in academic and practitioner circles in the United Kingdom and, 
to an extent, most states in the United States, is that which is commonly referred to as 
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1 On the two dominant conceptions of the corporate objective, see e.g. W. Allen, ‘Our Schizophrenic 
Conception of the Business Corporation’ (1992) 14 Cardozo Law Review 261, 264-266.  On the path 
dependency of this debate, see W. W. Bratton, ‘Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn’ 
(2001) 26 Journal of Corporation Law 737, 762. 
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“shareholder value”.2 This approach typically positions shareholder interests at the 
centre of the company law and governance process, and assigns the priority interest to 
shareholders relative to all other stakeholders.  Within this framework of legal and 
regulatory purpose, once shareholder value is accepted, it is tempting to see that the 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies can – and should – be more effectively 
protected through extraneous regulation or wealth redistribution through taxation.3 
Two rationales for shareholder value, which characterise companies as “private”, 
have garnered widespread approval.  First, the principle is often explained, or 
justified, on the basis that shareholders “own” the company, and are entitled, as 
ultimate risk bearers, to have it managed for their benefit.4 What is more, ownership 
also provides legitimacy to the corporate form itself.  So long as it is owned by 
individuals, the economic and political power of the company is both benign and a 
safeguard against the intrusion of the state. 5  Second, an alternative paradigm 
disaggregates the corporate form into no more than freely negotiated contracts, either 
express or implied, between asocial, self-maximising economic actors involved in the 
company’s affairs.6 From this perspective, company law, being the body of rules that 
                                                        
2 See e.g. ‘J. Armour, S. Deakin, and S. J. Konzelmann, ‘Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of 
UK Corporate Governance’ (2003) 41(3) British Journal of Industrial Relations 531.  For a detailed 
account, and critique, of the various rationales for shareholder primacy, see R. Chen and J. Hanson, 
‘The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law’ (2004) 103 
Michigan Law Review 1.  On the relative ambivalence of U.S. corporate law generally, see e.g. D. G. 
Baird and M. T. Henderson, ‘Other People’s Money’ (2008) Stanford Law Review 1309, 1312. 
3 H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman, ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’ (2000) 89 Georgetown Law 
Journal 439, 442; L. Sealy, ‘Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities – Problems Conceptual, Practical and 
Procedural’ (1987) 13 Monash Law Review 164, 176. 
4 M. Friedman, ‘The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits’ (1970) The New York 
Times Magazine at 17.  For criticisms of the idea that shareholders ‘own’ the business, see e.g. R. 
Grantham, ‘The Doctrinal Basis of the Rights of Company Shareholders’ (1998) 57 Cambridge Law 
Journal 554, 554-555; P. Ireland, ‘Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership’ (1999) 62 
Modern Law Review 32 at 32, 48-49. 
5 M. Stokes, ‘Company Law and Legal Theory’ in W. Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and Common Law 
(Blackwell, 1986), 156-157. 
6  See generally, A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs and Economic 
Organizations’ (1972) 62 American Economic Review 777; M. Jensen and W. Meckling, ‘Managerial 
Behaviour, agency costs and ownership structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305; E. 
Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’ (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy’ 228; 
The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Harvard University Press, 1991).  For works suggesting 
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governs these complex contracts, almost always is – and should be – largely a passive 
adjunct to the socially optimally contracting process that creates a company. 7 
Following on from this, stakeholder-oriented scholarship currently offers a rejoinder 
to the enduring significance of shareholder value. 8  This approach submits that 
companies are “public”, and have responsibilities to corporate constituencies other 
than shareholders.  At one level, it has been proposed that it is in the interests of 
shareholders to take account of a social or public expectations and preferences.  This 
view regards the development of long-term relations, trust, and commitment as part of 
the successful development of companies.  However, there is a broader concept that 
companies should not simply be run in the interests of shareholders; they have 
responsibilities to other stakeholders, which may on occasion conflict with their 
objective of shareholder value.  This line of argument sees the company as an entity 
that is distinct from its shareholders, where ownership and control is spread amongst a 
number of parties.   
 
A significant part of this debate in English law and scholarship has involved the 
analysis of the fiduciary duty of good faith, which is traditionally presented as an 
important branch of the duty of loyalty.  The duty of good faith plays a pivotal role in 
focusing directors on the purpose of the company, ensuring that, when directors 
exercise discretionary administrative power, it is directed towards the company’s 
                                                                                                                                                              
that private contracting alone is unlikely to produce optimal corporate governance arrangements, see 
e.g. M. Klausner, ‘Face and Fiction in Corporate Law and Governance’ (2013) 65 Stanford Law 
Review 1325; W. W. Bratton, ‘The “Nexus of Contracts” Corporation: A Critical Appraisal’ (1989) 74 
Cornell Law Review 1703. 
7 Easterbrook and Fischel, ibid, 15. Cf. the legal positivist approach set forth in M. Eisenberg, The 
Structure of the Corporation (Little, Brown & Co., 1976).  
8 See e.g. J. E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility (OUP, 1995) 140-141; J. Dine, The 
Governance of Corporate Groups (CUP, 2000), 12-17; R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of 
Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions’ (1994) 4 Business Ethics Quarterly 409, 417.  On the 
shortcomings of stakeholder theory, see A. R. Keay, ‘Stakeholder Theory in Corporate Law: Has it Got 
What it Takes?’ (2010) 9(3) Richmond Journal of Global Law & Business 249, 269-298. 
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interests.9 Historically, directors’ general duties were set out as a mixture of common 
law rules and equitable principles.  Following on from the Companies Act 2006 (“the 
2006 Act”) receiving Royal Assent on the 8 November 2006 and being enacted into 
English law, Chapter 2 of Part 10 of the Act codified these duties in statutory form.  
The duty of good faith is now set out in section 172.  Much ink has been spilled over 
the pages of policy documents, practice briefings, law reviews, monographs, and 
textbooks about the question of to whom the duty is owed.  The consensus reading of 
the provision is that the substantive content of the codified duty includes an express 
obligation to shareholders, whom are the presumptive recipients of the provision, and 
appreciate the priority interest in both economics and governance of the company, to 
which the interests of other corporate constituencies are secondary.  But equally, 
much confusion remains because this duty, according to an introductory section to the 
codified general duties, is ‘based on certain common law rules and equitable 
principles’ and ‘shall be interpreted and applied in the same way as common law rules 
or equitable principles’.10 Prior to the 2006 Act, a director of a company owed her 
fiduciary and common law duties to “the company” as a distinct legal entity. 11 
Precisely what equated to the interests of the company was something of a contested 
matter, with debates among scholars, judges, and policymakers having endured from 
the nineteenth century to the present day.  On one reading of the common law good 
faith requirement, obiter dicta inheres in a slim number of cases to suggest that 
companies exist for their shareholders. 12  On another reading, the nature of the 
subjective good faith review standard required the English courts to defer to the 
exercise of discretion in managing a company’s affairs, and this quiescence, in some 
                                                        
9 S. Worthington, ‘Reforming Directors’ Duties’ (2001) 64(3) Modern Law Review 439, 447. 
10 CA 2006, s 170(3)-(4).    
11 See e.g. Peskin v Anderson [2000] EWCA Civ 326; Pervical v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421.   
12 See below n 44. 
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sense, precluded wholesale judicial attempts to specify the corporate interest.13 This 
account of the law deferring to the exercise of discretion, to some, has implied the 
idea of the socially responsible company, in which a range of values or ‘stakes’, along 
with the interests of shareholders, can be held in balance.14 Above all else, the issue, 
in the present context, is that a contest between probabilities of meaning in the pre-
existing common law and the modern statutory restatement generates an 
incontrovertible problem for contemporary English company law and policy.15    
 
This article provides a critical evaluation of the English common law approach to 
regulating discretion.  The article submits that the accounts made by the proponents 
and opponents of shareholder value, and more stakeholder-oriented positions in UK 
scholarship, are organised by partially contextualised and inadequately analysed 
representations of the common law duty to act in good faith in the interests of the 
company.  These representations, in turn, form and structure a distorted understanding 
of English law.  Against this backdrop, the article makes three claims about this 
subject matter.  First, it is submitted that the pre-2006 cases customarily regarded as 
answering the question about the rightful beneficiary of the director’s fiduciary duty 
of good faith, in concrete terms, reveal that the curious equation between a company 
and its shareholders as a constituency receives little more than a mention in relation to 
directors’ duties.  Even in the apparently more pronounced shareholder value 
decisions, the fact the courts enumerated only specific pro-shareholder observations 
about the company’s interests, and often limited those remarks to the particular facts, 
provides all the more reason to believe the courts had no intention of making 
                                                        
13 See below nn 45-46. 
14 See below n 47. 
15  This concern about codification is raised in P. Davies and S. Worthington, Gower & Davies 
Principles of Modern Company Law (Sweet and Maxwell, 10th edn., 2016) 504. 
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shareholder value a de facto right in English law.  Similarly, unless otherwise 
provided for under the company’s articles of association, the respective cases reveal a 
presumptive silencing of an express consideration and protection of social or public 
interests unaligned to a corporate benefit.  Second, this work argues that a closer 
inspection of the limited number of authorities that consider directly the good faith 
obligation involve the realisation by the courts that the possession and exercise of 
executive power formally rests on the exclusive consent of shareholders in general 
meeting, which unilaterally determine the specific activities for which the company 
has been formed and substantially grants corporate power to the directors.  In this 
regard, the interests of the shareholder body silently structure the duty to act in the 
company’s interests.  However, this is not understood as an inelegant and ineloquent 
‘maximisation of shareholder value’ instruction, but as an arguably more functional 
and nuanced consideration and protection of the greater corporate ‘good’, i.e. the 
flourishing and continuing survival of the company’s business.  Third, the legislative 
reform project that resulted in the codification of the duty of good faith is a reminder 
that statutory drafting in novel circumstances sometimes involves the legislature in re-
writing important corporate legal rules, under the impression that it is following 
orthodox principles.  In particular, section 172 subordinates the company’s 
commercial interests to the interests of shareholders as a constituency.   Following 
Berle’s call for the company’s interests to be regarded along private-individualistic 
lines,16 the fact that the English common law has never unequivocally affirmed such 
an understanding has been increasingly ignored within company law-making and 
academic circles.  Today, appropriate weight to the company’s autonomous 
commercial interest is fading.  Without it, there is the risk that the company’s ability 
                                                        
16 See A. A. Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1049; E. 
Merrick Dodd, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1145; 
A. A. Berle, ‘For Whom are Managers Trustees: A Note’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365. 
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to preserve or invest resources and capital in long-term projects and to generate value 
is weakened.   
 
2. THE PRESENT LAW ON THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
It is scarcely a new or exciting truth that English company law and regulation has 
always been more shareholder-oriented than the approach adopted in most states in 
the United States.17 Whilst in one sense the dominant shareholder value imperative 
cannot be reduced to a pithy rule of law and enforceable sanction, as Marc Moore 
reasons, ‘there are nonetheless an important collection of rules and principles which 
mutually establish this functionally significant corporate-managerial norm.’ 18 
Shareholders do, of course, retain the power to exercise limited control rights under 
companies’ legislation,19 and to vote on certain other corporate transactions.20 What is 
more, the Takeover Code’s non-frustration rule and mandatory bid rule mutually 
establish a pro-shareholder approach to takeover bids,21 while the UK Listing Rules 
require prior shareholder approval for all economically significant corporate 
transactions.22 But arguably, it is within the legal principle that directors must act in 
good faith in the interests of the company that shareholder value thinking is regarded 
to find its most direct and overt expression.23 As a matter of intellectual history, this 
                                                        
17 See above n 2. 
18 M. Moore, ‘Shareholder primacy, Labour, and the Historic Ambivalence of UK Company Law’ in 
Harwell Wells (ed), Research Handbook on the History of Corporate and Company Law (Edward 
Elgar, 2018) 145. 
19 See e.g. CA 2006, ss 21 (the right to amend the constitution with a special resolution); s 168 
(mandatory ‘without cause’ removal right); ss 303-305 (the right to call meetings with five per cent of 
votes); ss 314-316 (the right to circulate resolutions). 
20 CA 2006, Part 10, Ch. 4. 
21 City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, Rules 9 and 21.   
22 See e.g. (in the case of Premium Listed companies) Listing Rules 10 and 11; (but also in the case of 
all UK-registered companies) CA 2006, ss 177, 182, and 190-196. 
23 The good faith requirement has sometimes been interpreted as a duty to act honestly.  On this point, 
see e.g. Regentcrest v Cohen [2001] BCC 494, 101.  See also, Company Law Review, Modern 
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework, (DTI, 2000) para. 3.50. 
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duty, ‘implicit by law’,24 formed a principal part of a common law and equitable 
framework of directors’ general duties, but is today partially codified under Chapter 2 
of Part 10 of the Companies Act 2006.25 The UK Government’s intention with an 
attempt at codification of directors’ general duties was to modernise and refine ‘[t]he 
substantial corpus of learning on the nature and scope of these general fiduciary or 
equitable duties and duties of care and skill’,26 the framework of which, and the rules 
related thereto, having developed incrementally since formulation by English 
Chancery courts during the pre-industrial period.27  In this regard, the transfer of 
directors’ general duties from their existing common law and equitable realm and into 
the ‘arguably more rigid and politically reactive territory of statute law’ 28  was 
commonly viewed as ‘a major landmark in the evolutionary history of the duties.’29 
 
The duty of good faith, now set out in section 172 of the 2006 Act, establishes the 
basis of directors’ accountability, and plays a pivotal role in focusing directors on the 
interests of the company, ensuring that, when directors exercise discretionary 
administrative authority, it is directed towards the company’s interests.30 Typically, 
the duty is not limited merely to the proscriptive obligations to avoid conflicts and 
profits, but also contemplates such prescriptive requirements as considering and, in 
                                                        
24 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd ([1942] Ch 304, 306; [1942] 2 All ER.542, per Lord Greene M.R. 
25 CA 2006, s 172.  Both the Law Commission and the Company Law Review recommended a ‘high 
level’ statutory restatement of the common law principles.  See Law Commission, Company Directors: 
Regulating Conflicts of Interest and Formulating a Statement of Duties, Law Com. No 261 and 
Scottish Law Com. No 173, Cm. 4436; Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a 
Competitive Economy: Final Report (DTI, 2001), Ch. 3 and Annex C.   
26 Davies and Worthington, above n 15, 502.  See also, Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of 
Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties (Law Commission Consultation Paper 261); Scottish 
Law Commission Paper No. 173 (September 1999)), at [4.40-4.41]. 
27 On effects of codification on the law, see H. R Hahlo, ‘Here Lies the Common Law: Rest in Peace’ 
(1967) 30(3) Modern Law Review 241, 244-246. 
28 M. Moore, Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State (Hart, 2013) 190 (and accompanying 
footnotes).   
29 D. Ahern, ‘Directors’ Duties, Dry Ink and the Accessibility Agenda [2012] Law Quarterly Review 
114, 114.  See also, M. Arden, ‘Regulating the Conduct of Directors’ (2010) 10(1) Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 1, 3-4 
30 Worthington, above n 9, 447. 
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some cases, investigating the company’s interests.31 On this basis, the statutory duty 
expressly requires that, in exercising his official managerial and control functions, ‘a 
director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most 
likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its [shareholders] as a 
whole [emphasis added].’  In doing so, directors are obliged to ‘have regard to’ a non-
exhaustive list of socio-economic criteria (e.g. the company’s long-term outlook, 
employees, customer and supplier relations, the environment), which are valued as 
merely instrumental (rather than being based upon any ethical or intrinsic 
significance) to fulfilling the primary element of the duty.  Under this approach, 
known as “enlightened shareholder value”,32 the 2006 Act clearly sets forth on a 
default mandatory basis 33  the legislative priority of the collective interests of 
shareholders, to which the less tangible claims of other constituencies or a 
combination of other constituencies may be taken into account provided that so doing 
furthers the shareholder focus.34 The genesis of this apparently narrow conception of 
the duty of good faith can be traced back to the Company Law Review Steering 
Committee, which was responsible for making recommendations to the Government 
as part of this legislative reform project, and its presumptive view that the legal 
principle, for the law, embodied a pro-shareholder bias.35 What is more, in spite of 
public furore about market short-termism post-2008 financial crisis, concerns about 
                                                        
31 R. Teele Langford, ‘Best Interests: Multifaceted But Not Unbounded’ (2016) 75(3) Cambridge Law 
Journal 505, 512-516. 
32 See Developing the Framework, above n 23, Ch. 3 and Company Law Review, Modern Company 
Law for a Competitive Economy: Completing the Structure (DTI, 2000), Ch. 3.   
33 The default mandatory status of this provision in the Companies Act 2006 refers to its mandatory 
and therefore binding status as a fiduciary rule, which could be amended by the corporate contract in 
respect to any individual company. 
34 D. Attenborough, ‘The Neoliberal (Il)legitimacy of the Duty of Loyalty’ (2014) 65(4) Northern 
Ireland Legal Quarterly 405, 418-427; C. M. Bruner, Corporate Governance in the Common-Law 
World (CUP, 2013), 34-35; Moore, above n 28, 191-195. 
35  See Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Strategic 
Framework (DTI, 1999); Davies and Worthington, above n 15.  See also, Re Southern Counties Fresh 
Foods Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810; Re West Coast Capital (Lios) Ltd [2008] CSOH 72; Cobden 
Investments Ltd v RWM Landport Ltd [2008] EWHC 2810 (Ch); Odyssey Entertainment Ltd. v Kamp 
[2012] EWHC 2316 (Ch.). 
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high levels of executive remuneration, a downward pressure on labour, and the 
existence of human rights abuses particularly by multi-national companies, the UK 
government has made clear in the publication of its response to a 2016 Green Paper 
on corporate governance reform that it has no foreseeable plans to amend the precise 
wording of section 172.36  
 
However, this does not mean that it is all to the good and that re-formulation of the 
old rules and the adoption of new rules has not thrown the law into a period of 
uncertainty as to its best reading, based on the difficulties inherent in the nature of 
language used, of composition, and of legislation generally.37 The default mandatory 
shareholder focus of section 172 is accurate so far as it goes, but many open questions 
remain about the relationship between the statutory formulation of the duty and its 
common law antecedent.  This is because the UK’s common law heritage continues to 
be generally determinative of questions of managerial behaviour in the sphere of this 
partial and emergent codification of directors’ general fiduciary duties.  To explain, 
section 170 prefaces the legislative statement of directors’ general duties, and sets out 
the scope and general nature of these obligations.  For us, section 170(4) gives clear 
recognition to the fact that the new duties are ‘based on certain common law rules and 
equitable principles’.38 In addition, since it would be ‘virtually impossible to express 
in the words of a statute all the intricacies and nuances of the general law’,39 the same 
provision expressly stipulates that ‘regard shall be had to the corresponding common 
                                                        
36 Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS), Corporate Governance Reform: 
The Government Response to the Green Paper Consultation (August 2017), para. 2.45.  But see the 
Companies (Miscellaneous Reporting) Regulations 2018, which introduce new reporting requirements 
on, amongst other things, how directors have had regard to the matters set out in section 172(1)(a)-(f) 
of the Companies Act 2006 in the exercise of their duties. 
37 Hahlo, above n 27, 249.   
38 CA 2006, s 170(3). 
39 Arden, above n 29, 3 
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law rules and equitable principles in interpreting and applying the general duties.’40 
The pre-2006 case law, therefore, remains immensely important in interpreting and 
clarifying the content of the codified duties.   
 
Historically, the common law formulation of the duty was owed to “the company” as 
a distinct legal entity,41 and it was for a director (and not the court) to decide, in good 
faith, on how best to further its interests.  It need hardly be said that what precisely 
equates to the company’s interests is something of a contested issue, because the 
expression is regarded to be ill-defined by the courts,42 with lively and controversial 
academic debates on this enduring from the nineteenth century to the present day.43 
On one reading of the common law, obiter dicta inheres in a relatively modest number 
of late-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century cases to suggest that shareholder interests 
were a proxy for the company’s interests.44 On another reading, the nature of the 
review standard to act in subjective good faith in the company’s interests, as it has 
been traditionally understood, was an acknowledged driver of the courts’ deferral to 
the exercise of discretion in managing the company’s affairs.45 No doubt, the courts 
tended to require, as a proxy for good faith, reasons to support the view that the 
decision or action furthered that interest goal, whatever it be, but the company’s 
                                                        
40 Ibid, s 170(4). 
41 See e.g. Peskin v Anderson [2000] EWCA Civ 326; Pervical v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421.  
42 A. Dignam and J. Lowry, Company Law (9th edn, OUP 2016) 314; Davies and Worthington, above 
n 15, 540; Moore, above n 28, 191 (and accompanying footnotes); D. D. Prentice, ‘Creditor’s Interests 
and Directors’ Duties’ (1990) 10 OJLS 265, 273; F. G. Rixon, ‘Competing Interests and Conflicting 
Principles: an Examination of the Power of Alteration of Articles of Association’ (1986) 49(4) Modern 
Law Review 446, 448. 
43 For a recent comment on the significance of this debate, see e.g. S. Lombard and T. Joubert, ‘The 
Legislative Response to the Shareholders v Stakeholders Debate: A Comparative Overview’ (2014) 
14(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 211, 211-213 (and accompanying footnotes).  On the political 
nature of this inquiry, see A. Gamble and G. Kelly, ‘The Politics of the Company’ in J. Parkinson, A. 
Gamble, and G. Kelly (eds.), The Political Economy of the Company (Hart, 2000) 21.   
44 See e.g. Strategic Framework, above n 35, paras. 5.1.4-5.1.5; Davies and Worthington, above n 15, 
540-541; D. Kershaw, Company Law in Context (OUP, 2nd edn., 2012) 336. 
45 See the picturesque dictum of Lord Eldon LC in Carlen v Drury (1812) 1 V & B 154, 158. 
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interests were cognisable only inferentially through this juridical inquiry. 46  This 
account of the law deferring to the exercise of discretion, to some, has implied the 
idea that companies can have positive obligations to secure the well-being of 
employees, the environment, or other corporate constituencies as ends in their own 
right.47 Overall, the upshot of this unsettled understanding of the common law good 
faith rule is that a dispute between probabilities of meaning, whether limited to the 
duty’s expectation of good faith or from a broader corporate governance perspective, 
generates a significant jurisprudential problem for contemporary English company 
law and policy.  
 
3. THE PRE-2006 ACT COMMON LAW DUTY TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH  
The following section, therefore, provides a critical, and necessary, evaluation of the 
pre-2006 doctrinal foundations of the duty of good faith under the English common 
law.  It is important to emphasise, by way of a disclaimer, that there is limited 
authority directly answering the question of which corporate constituencies interests 
are the company’s interests.  Notwithstanding, it is argued that accounts about the 
company’s interests equating to the collective interest of shareholders, and alternative 
views on the rightful beneficiary of directors’ duties, are structured by partially 
contextualised and inadequately analysed representations of the common law duty to 
act in good faith in the interests of the company.   These representations, in turn, form 
and structure modified understandings of English law.   
 
                                                        
46 K. W. Wedderburn, The Future of Company Law, Corporate Governance, Fat Cats and Workers 
(Liverpool Institute of Employment Rights, 2004) 25-26.  Of course, the approach the courts adopt 
when reviewing compliance with the duty follows the existing approach in Regentcrest v Cohen [2001] 
BCC 494. 
47 For a widely supported statement about the ambiguity of English company law, see L. A. Stout, et al, 
‘The Modern Corporation Statement on Company Law’ (2016) 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2848833>. 
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a. Ignoring the Hutton/Parke decisions 
Undoubtedly, because of the aversion to litigation in UK company law and practice,48 
the academic commentary on the good faith requirement devotes a tremendous 
amount of attention to a small handful of judicial opinions as being representative of 
trends in the purpose of companies.  There are two often-cited cases that merit our 
attention.  The classic English decision that is customarily interpreted as 
determinative in this regard is Hutton v West Cork Railway Co,49 decided in 1883, 
which is a case that turned on the limits of a company to make gratuities to its 
outgoing board of directors immediately prior to the company’s winding up.  The 
judgment is well known, in particular, for Bowen LJ’s oft-cited dictum that, ‘there are 
to be no cakes and ale [for employees] except such as are required for the benefit of 
the company.’50 This single sentence has been subsequently construed, on the basis of 
nothing more than an uncritical citation of His Lordship’s dicta, as authority for the 
principle that ‘generosity to employees was held to be lawful only if it could be 
justified by reference to the long-term interests of the shareholders.’51 Similarly, in 
the case of Parke v Daily News Ltd.,52 decided in 1962, the question was raised 
whether it is legitimate on the cessation of the whole or part of the company’s 
business for gratuitous compensation to be paid out of its assets to retrenched 
employees to relieve hardship and for pension benefits.  Plowman J quoted with 
approval the judgment of Lord Justice Bowen in Hutton; in particular, His Lordship 
went on to state that ‘the ‘benefit of the company’ meant the benefit of the 
                                                        
48 D. D. Prentice, ‘Some Aspects of the Corporate Governance Debate’ in D. D. Prentice and P. R. J. 
Holland (eds), Contemporary Issues in Corporate Governance (Clarendon, 1993), 39. 
49 (1883) Ch D 654. 
50 Ibid, 673.  Cf. Re Horsley & Weight Ltd. [1982] Ch 442 (now under CA 2006, s 172(2)).  But still, it 
must be acknowledged that such non-commercial provisions were not always viewed favourably in 
first instance decisions.  See Re Lee, Behrens & Co Ltd [1932] 2 Ch 46; Re W & M Roith Ltd [1967] 1 
WLR 432; Simmonds v Heffer [1983] BCLC 298. 
51 L. Sealy and S. Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law (OUP, 11th edn., 2016), 337. 
52 [1962] Ch 927. 
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shareholders as a general body’.53 Although Plowman J, remarkably, then went on to 
stake out an apparently self-contradictory view in the next paragraph of his 
judgment, 54  the case is regarded to uphold English law’s insistence that non-
shareholder considerations ‘however meritorious, would not… form part of a true 
legal definition of the interests of the companies’.55  
 
As expressed above, the respective decisions in Hutton and also the later Parke case 
have been customarily cited as a reasonably accurate juridical articulation of the 
corporate interest.  Notwithstanding, this apparently pro-shareholder interpretation of 
the good faith requirement in both authorities has had many critics.  Some have noted 
the fact that the court in Hutton stopped short of specifying the identity of the rightful 
beneficiaries directors’ fiduciary discretion.56 Others sought to show that collective 
shareholder entitlements, relative to the company’s employees, were little more than a 
benign influence on both cases, which were instead decided on reasonably technical 
ultra vires grounds.57 In this regard, the respective rulings do not provide a direct 
statement of the company’s interests, whether the inquiry limits itself to expressive 
legal doctrine or is posed at a more general normative level.  Yet, while the academic 
or practitioner dialogue continues to pivot around these important and influential 
cases, the Hutton/Parke rulings are, it is submitted, and contrary to accepted wisdom, 
of somewhat questionable authority for the purpose of ascertaining the company’s 
                                                        
53 Ibid, 963. 
54 Parke, above n 52, 963, where His Lordship said, ‘the directors of the defendant company are 
proposing that a very large part of its funds should be given to its former employees in order to benefit 
those employees rather than the company, and that is an application of the company’s funds which the 
law, as I understand it, will not allow [emphasis added].’  This free-floating corporate interest 
conspicuously left out of account the counterfactual question of any benefit to the shareholders.  On 
this point, see R. Instone, ‘The Duty of Directors’ [1979] Journal of Business Law 221, 227. 
55 E. M. Holland, Report of the Second Savoy Hotel Investigation (London, HMSO, 1954) 23.   
56 A. R. Keay, The Enlightened Shareholder Value Principle and Corporate Governance (Routledge, 
2013) 54. 
57 Moore, above n 18, 155-156.  
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interests.  This is because the respective cases fall within the limited “end-game” or 
insolvency paradigm.  The implication that these decisions were influenced or formed 
by that paradigm is irresistible.  Indeed, the good faith obligation requires directors, at 
a time when the company is insolvent or in the vicinity of insolvency, to take account 
of the interests of the company’s creditors.  The reason provided for this position is 
that if the company is in some form of financial distress, ‘the interests of the company 
are in reality the interests of existing creditors alone.’ 58  Thus, at this point, the 
significant residual value of the company is, in effect, transferred to creditors, who are 
seen as having the greatest stake in the outcome of the company.59 Because the 
respective businesses in Hutton and Parke were effectively trading with the creditors’ 
money, the directors have an obligation not to sacrifice the residual interest. 60 
Accordingly, both cases can be understood this way: since the directors have little to 
lose where their company is in financial distress, if they engage in gratuitously 
transferring corporate funds to employees (or, indeed, any other corporate 
constituency), then the creditors will be the ones to lose out if the payment does not 
bear fruit for the business of the company.61   
 
b. The company’s interests during solvency 
                                                        
58 If authority is required, see e.g. Brady v Brady (1988) 3 BCC 535, 552. 
59 See A. Keay, Directors’ Duties to Creditors: Contractarian Concerns Relating to Efficiency and 
Over-Protection of Creditors’ (2003) 66(5) Modern Law Review 665, 668.  For the view that several 
groups could be regarded as exposed to residual risk, see G. Kelly and J. Parkinson, ‘The Conceptual 
Foundations of the Company: A Pluralist Approach’ (1998) 2 Company, Financial, and Insolvency 
Law Review 174. 
60 Keay, Ibid. 
61 Of course, the directors of solvent companies, which have no concerns about insolvent liquidation, 
might take a more liberal approach to approving strategic choices that have a direct impact on the non-
shareholder interests, but this was merely a procedural means towards the ultimate end of enhancing 
the company’s particular business objects.   
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Overend & Gurney Co. v Gibb62 and Lagunas Nitrate Co v Lagunas Syndicate63 are 
nineteenth century decisions that provide, it must be said, more direct and 
conspicuous articulation of the company’s interests, but which have been overlooked 
in the legal literature. 64  This is perhaps because commentators have failed to 
understand the extent to which the respective rulings have a bearing on English 
company law outside the scope of standards for reviewing the quality of the business 
judgment.  Notably, although in both cases the business ultimately failed, the decision 
subjected to review was not made immediately prior to insolvency but rather while 
the company was a going concern.  Overend involved one of the largest and long-
established banks in the City of London, which was sold to a newly incorporated 
company, Overend, Gurney & Co. Ltd.  The prospectus issued to the public concealed 
the fact that the business had incurred huge losses as a result of questionable 
investments and bad debts and had been carried on at a loss for some years.  
Ultimately, the combination of more generalised economic instability, some 
unfortunate rumours, and a court case that ruled they could not collect from a debtor 
led to it being declared insolvent.  In this case, Lord Hatherley observed that the 
company, as a legal entity distinct from its existing shareholders,65 was formed for the 
express purpose of carrying into effect the arrangement to acquire and continue what 
was still considered to be a profitable business notwithstanding debt that continued to 
weigh upon the concern.66 For us, what matters is not the reasons-based standards 
applied to the defendant directors’ decision propriety, but rather that the House of 
Lords’ judgment accepted the decision was taken in good faith in the corporate 
                                                        
62 (1872) L.R. 5 H.L. 480.  
63 [1899] 2 Ch. 392.  
64 One rare example can be found in D. Kershaw, The Foundations of Anglo-American Corporate 
Fiduciary Law (CUP, 2019) 42-46. 
65 Overend & Gurney, above n 62, 489.  See also, the dicta of Lord Chelmsford and Lord Westbury, 
496, 502. 
66 Ibid, 489. 
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interest.  On this basis, Lord Hatherley, with whom all three other members of the 
House of Lords agreed, 67  went on to stake out an unmistakably commercial 
conception of the company’s interests which, by implication, is derived from the 
ultimate purpose of the transaction.  His Lordship contemplated an understanding of 
the corporate interest to which, free from any difficulties that might press upon it at 
commencement, and by managing it in a better way, a ‘flourishing and successful’ 
business concern is central.68 So understood, when the obligation formulated by the 
House of Lords is read in the context of the facts of the case, and by the light of the 
principles that were being laid down by Lord Hatherley when he used the phrase, ‘the 
interests of the company’ is plainly seen to have been used to signify the company as 
an independent entity with an interest in pursuing its particular business objects and 
sustainability.   
 
A similar separation of the company’s commercial interest and corporate 
constituencies interest occurs in Lagunas Nitrate Co v Lagunas Syndicate. 69  In 
Lagunas, a syndicate of investors held nitrate lands in Chilli five years before they 
promoted and formed a company to purchase part of the lands.  Two years after the 
date of the purchase, it was apparent that the deposits were less rich and more onerous 
to extract than had been claimed due, among other things, to problems with the local 
water supply.  An action was brought against the directors for breach of duty with a 
view to the interests of the company in entering into the acquisition.  Lindley, MR, 
and Collins, LJ (with Rigby, LJ dissenting) in the Court of Appeal held that there was 
no liability for the consequences of errors of judgment on the basis that the directors 
truly and reasonably believed that what they were doing was for the best interests of 
                                                        
67 Ibid, 493, 500, 506, as per the dicta of Lord Chelmsford and Lord Westbury. 
68 Ibid, 491. 
69 [1899] 2 Ch. 392.  
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the company. Lindley MR clearly regards the nitrate company, in its corporate 
capacity, as an entity distinct from its shareholders, namely referring to persons who 
‘become shareholders in it’, the company ‘binding itself’, or companies as ‘distinct 
commercial bodies [emphasis added]’.70 In His Lordship’s judgment, the independent 
existence of the company plainly informs his conclusion that, notwithstanding all the 
difficulties, the directors had ‘no necessity, in the interest of the nitrate company, for 
delay, nor for modifying the contract’, not least because ‘large profits would be 
realised by the nitrate company.’71 In addition to this, Collins LJ, in a concurring 
judgment, similarly emphasised the independent existence of the company,72 and it 
was on this basis that he remarked, ‘when the right of such companies to exist and 
carry out the purpose of their creation, according to the conditions of their 
constitution, is admitted, it would be unwise to lay down a standard of duty which 
would make it a practical impossibility to manage the undertaking upon ordinary 
business lines.’73 For now, then, the key takeaway point is that the corporate interest, 
to the Court of Appeal, is understood to signify advancing the particular business 
objects of the company as a commercial entity, ensuring it develops and flourishes, 
and safeguarding its longevity. 
 
Perhaps the leading authority that is customarily regarded to conflate the duty of good 
faith with promoting the exclusive and collective interests of shareholders is the Court 
of Appeal’s ruling in the 1951 case of Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd.74 In 
particular, Lord Evershed MR, with whose judgment the other members of the court 
agreed, apparently ruled out a free floating corporate interest when he said that ‘the 
                                                        
70 Ibid, 422, 426, 432. 
71 Ibid, 437-438. 
72 Ibid, 463. 
73 Ibid, 465. 
74 [1951] Ch 286. 
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phrase, “interests of the company as a whole”, does not mean the company as a 
[distinct] commercial entity,’ but rather ‘it means the [shareholders] as a general 
body.’75 This quotation from the ruling is cited in most texts and commentaries as 
evidence that English company law requires companies to have a profit maximisaing 
objective, and that managers and directors have a legal duty to put shareholder 
interests above all others and no legal authority to serve any other interests.  But 
clearly, those who seek to rely upon the above dictum as authority for the shareholder 
primacy position typically ignore two important points.  First, Evershed MR’s 
comments were expressly confined to ‘such a case as present’, 76  as opposed to 
stipulating any sort of general principle of application.77 This observation is reflected 
in an earlier authority, decided on different facts, where Evershed MR this time 
rejected the notion that shareholders were the owners of the company because, to His 
Lordship, ‘[t]he [company] is something different from the totality of the 
shareholding.’78 Accordingly, stripped of the “story” about the case, the well-worn 
dictum in Greenhalgh is, it must be said, no authority for the suggestion that the 
shareholders interests are the corporate interest.  Second, the case involves a minority-
majority shareholder dispute over whether a resolution to amend the company’s 
articles of association was taken in the company’s interests.79 Although the same 
meaning of the ‘interests of the company’ applied when an issue was solely one of the 
                                                        
75 Ibid, 291. 
76 [1951] Ch 286, 291. 
77 D. Attenborough, ‘How directors should act when owing duties to the companies’ shareholders: why 
we need to stop applying Greenhalgh’ (2009) 20(10) International Company and Commercial Law 
Review  339, 344.  For recognition in subsequent decisions of the nature of Evershed MR’s context-
specific comments, see e.g. Re Halt Garage Ltd. [1982] 3 All E.R. 1016 (Ch.D.).  Many years later, 
Nourse LJ adopted a fundamentally similar approach in Brady v Brady, above n 58, 552.  
78 Short v Treasury Commissioners [1948] 1 KB 116, 122.  For a similar approach, see Tate Access 
Floors Inc. v Boswell [1991] Ch 512, 531, per Browne-Wilkinson VC.   
79 R. W. Parsons, ‘The Director’s Duty of Good Faith’ (1967) 5 Melbourne University Law Review 
395, 423.  See also, Keay, above n 56, 55. 
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duties of directors,80 the authority itself would appear to relate specifically to an 
examination of the power of shareholders acting in general meeting to alter the 
constitution, rather than to address the question of which corporate constituencies 
interests are the company’s interests.81  
 
Such criticisms notwithstanding, our account of Greenhalgh remains unfinished 
without discussing one further dimension to the case.  This is a related, although often 
overlooked, issue about the bearing of the judicial test for establishing whether a 
proposed constitutional amendment is, in the honest opinion of those who voted in its 
favour, for the benefit of the elusive ‘individual hypothetical shareholder’.82 This is a 
person whose existence, in the words of Ross Parsons, ‘is asserted with monotonous 
repetition in the law reports, but who remains singularly lacking in substance.’83 It is 
submitted, however, that the question of whether what is proposed is for that person’s 
benefit is in substantial character, so to speak, a rhetorical device to identify and give 
significance to the law’s conception of what is thought to be in the commercial 
interests of the company’s business as a going concern.84 On the facts of the case, the 
proposed shareholder resolution to alter the articles of association was to enable 
existing shareholders to sell the business of the company to a purchaser outside the 
company who had offered to buy all of its shares.  In this regard, the purpose of 
giving effect to the particular transaction was, it would seem, reasonably incidental to 
the ultimate end of the prosperity and continuation of the company’s productive 
business or, at the least, to enable the perceived governance dispute to be resolved 
                                                        
80 J. Birds, D. Attenborough, M. Leiser, M. Solinas, M. R. Varney, and Z. Zhang, Boyle & Birds’ 
Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 10th edn., 2019), [ ].   
81 Attenborough, above n 77, 343. 
82 Greenhalgh, above n 76, 291. 
83 Parsons, above n 79, 396. 
84 Greenhalgh, above n 76, 291. 
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before it occasioned costs to its capital and assets.  The idea that corporate power 
must be exercised in pursuit of the company’s specified business objects and act with 
good faith towards it implies, in turn, that the interests of shareholders, or the 
particular interests of employees, consumers, and the public at large, do not 
practically enter the business calculus.85    
 
One of the most recent cases that is commonly cited in support of the proposition that 
the collective interests of shareholders are the company’s interests is Gaiman v 
National Association for Mental Health.86  In simple terms, the case involves the 
unsuccessfully contested exercise of the managerial power, derived from the articles 
of association, to expel certain members of a company that carried out charitable 
activities.  The question, then, is whether the defendant directors had exercised that 
power of expulsion for the purpose for which it was conferred, and whether it had 
been exercised in good faith in the best interests of the company.  In holding that the 
directors exercised corporate power in good faith in the corporate interest, Megarry J 
referenced the collective membership focus of the ‘interests of the company’, put 
forward by Lord Evershed in Greenhalgh, describing it as ‘a helpful expression of a 
human equivalent.’87 However, it is questionable the extent to which the dicta in 
Greenhalgh, formulated in the context of a private company, applies to the special 
circumstances of a non-profit-making company limited by guarantee. 88  Similarly, 
Greenhalgh deals with wholly distinctive circumstances that could not be more 
                                                        
85 A notable exception is in the context of majority expropriation of the minority shareholder.  See 
Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co. (Maidenhead) [1927] 2 KB 9; Dafen Tinplate Co. v Llanelly Steel 
Co. [1920] 1 Ch 154.   
86 [1971] Ch 317. 
87 Ibid, 330-331 
88 L. S. Sealy, ‘”Bona Fides” and “Proper Purposes” in Corporate Decisions’ (1989) 15(3) Monash 
University Law Review 265, 271. 
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incompatible with the scenario in Gaiman.89 On the contrary, when the judgment of 
Megarry J is read in its entirety, this dictum, identifying the company with the general 
body of shareholders, is arguably a slip of the pen, or represents the status of a useful 
metaphor or analogy, involving a momentary transference of meaning in the use of 
the same word.  If that be so, there can be no doubt that wherever in the passage His 
Lordship speaks of the company, he means the “body corporate”90 and that when he 
speaks of the benefit of the company, he means the duty of directors to the company 
is to do their best to promote moral and active support for the association, increase its 
revenue, and realise the association’s particular purpose or vision.91   
 
c. Summarising the common law corporate interest 
To summarise the position so far, the common law conceptualisation of the duty of 
good faith, in some respect, embodies a time-factor that arguably already protects 
non-shareholder corporate constituencies, albeit in implicit terms, in the sense that the 
directors may, and indeed must, direct their efforts towards securing the prosperity 
and longevity of the company’s particular business objects.  In this regard, the law 
requires, at the least, that the directors ensure there is an entity in existence on a 
continuing basis, thus offering less tangible benefits on a continuing basis and also 
furthering or protecting the interests of other persons or groups.  In more direct terms, 
a commercial company could, of course, elect to define its interests differently in its 
articles, i.e. to be run in the interests of other corporate constituencies or a 
combination of constituencies.92 This would avoid the law’s requirement that gifts of 
corporate monies made under implied or ancillary powers must be both made in good 
                                                        
89 D. Prentice, ‘Expulsion of Members from a Company’ (1970) 33(6) Modern Law Review 700, 701-
702.   
90 Gaiman, above n 86, 335-336. 
91 Ibid, 132, 338-339. 
92 Re Horsley & Weight Ltd, above n 51. 
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faith and of benefit to and for the company.  Such possibilities notwithstanding, the 
analysis above illustrates that stakeholder-oriented scholarship has increasingly 
ignored an absence of descriptive support, in explicit terms, for the good faith 
obligation to deploy corporate power to provide equal weighting to other corporate 
constituencies in furthering the company’s interests.93 In fact, the interests of non-
shareholder constituencies, so far as the corporate interest is concerned, might as well 
not exist: directors cannot, in exercising their powers, take account directly of the 
interests of these individuals or groups in their own right.  Undoubtedly, the limited 
number of often-cited authorities that have been interpreted as affirming a social or 
public conceptulisation of the company’s interests have only marginal or no direct 
influence on the issue of the proper beneficiary of directors’ fiduciary discretion,94 
and often involve relatively unique incidents of what might be regarded as corporate 
social responsibility immediately prior to the cessation of the whole or part of the 
company’s business.95 We must be cautious, therefore, not to draw any reductive or 
inferential conclusions.  More generally, and with a wider historical sweep, there is 
little evidence elsewhere in the principles and policies of the common law, or the 
prominent legal-institutional features of English corporate governance, of an overt 
and intelligible inclination towards laying down rules that directly promote or protect 
social or ethical decisions in the corporate context.   
 
Simultaneously, the direct equation between the interests of shareholders alone and 
the company’s interests receives little more than a mention in relation to the good 
faith requirement, though countless texts and commentaries have since described it as 
                                                        
93 For a representative example, see e.g. Stout, et al, above n 47. 
94 Moore, above n 18, 153-154.   
95 Ibid, 155.   
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an established legal principle. 96  No doubt, given the unincorporated partnership 
origins of the “modern” company, and the continued use in contemporary English 
legal parlance of “companies” and “company law”, there will always be room to 
argue that the discipline continues to reflect an implicit and enduring acceptance of 
mutual shareholder agreement, rather than being predicated on free-floating notions of 
the corporate interest.97 Yet it should be borne in mind that the House of Lords’ ruling 
in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd.,98 which gave effect to the doctrine of corporate 
personality established in the Companies Act 1862,99 gives credence to the view that 
the law had already internalised the existence of the company as an entity before all of 
the key cases were decided.  As well, it is precisely because directors, in exercising 
their managerial and policy-making powers, owe no direct duty to shareholders as 
such,100 and because their duty to the company cannot be reformulated as a duty to 
shareholders, that the rule in Foss v Harbottle101 survives.  This conceptualisation is 
maintained, in concrete terms, in cases like Greenhalgh, in the sense that the fact the 
Court of Appeal enumerated only specific pro-shareholder observations about the 
interests of the company, and often confined those utterances to the case at hand, 
                                                        
96  For a representative sample, see Davies and Worthington, above n 15, 16-1; The Strategic 
Framework, above n 35; R. Goddard, ‘Modernising Company Law: The Government’s White Paper’ 
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provides all the more reason to believe the court had no intention of making the 
collective interests of shareholders a de facto right in the common law.   
 
Properly understood, the juridical articulation of the directors’ proper fiduciary 
objective is, it is submitted, organised around the conception and underlying power 
structure of a UK company. 102  Although, strictly speaking, the distribution of 
corporate power in UK companies consists largely of internal default rules, most 
typically set out in the articles of association, the effect of these simple and facultative 
rules is to produce a broadly similar type of governance structure.  Obviously, the 
directors occupy a pre-eminent position in the management of the company’s 
affairs.103 The directors, who are subject to a mandatory ‘without cause’ removal 
right,104 cannot be controlled by the shareholders in general meeting as if they were 
delegates or agents.105 However, it is the shareholders in general meeting, through 
their exclusive province over the contents of the articles, which unilaterally determine 
the specific activities for which the company has been formed and substantially grants 
corporate power to the directors.106 In any delegation of power setting, of course, it is 
an established legal principle that the delegate has a good faith obligation to further 
the delegator’s interests.  On this view, the sovereign interests of the shareholders as a 
constituency, it might be inferred, silently structure the director’s exercise of that 
power.  To be clear, in the limited number of cases, analysed above, the delegation of 
corporate power inference is not understood as driving a crude and impractical 
“maximisation of shareholder value” instruction.  On the contrary, although the 
courts’ have often stopped short of providing conclusive answers to the core question 
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104 CA 2006, s 168. 
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of the company’s interests,107 and taken in itself the phrase is an ambiguous one,108 
the essential nature of the courts’ diction still settles on the arguably more functional 
and nuanced autonomous commercial interests of the company, and what would 
enhance the prosperity and continuing survival of its particular business objects.  Any 
benefits for shareholders, in addition to other individuals or groups with less tangible 
claims against the company, flow from that very object.   
 
Now there is in one respect in which, when a commercial company is formed with the 
object of making profits, at some point of financial stability its continuing interests, as 
an independent legal entity, usually coincide with that of its shareholders.109 In such a 
case, and to that extent, it can be said that the actions of the directors must be capable 
of producing some return for the shareholders, who retain the residual interest when 
the company is solvent.  However, the extensive role played by the good faith 
requirement in focusing directors on the company as a commercial entity and what 
will enhance its assets and resources, for the law, does not mean that the corporate 
interest is necessarily measured by how much profit has been made for both 
shareholders as a group or the interests of a section of that group.  On many issues, 
the company’s particular business objects and its shareholder interest in share value 
diverge, to the extent that a company pursuing only shareholder value might transfer 
value away from the business enterprise or fail to be able to meet its obligations.  In 
this way, as Ross Grantham notes, ‘even in those cases that pit shareholders against 
each other, if the commercial interests of the company as an entity are relevant it 
seems that the corporate interest will not be defined exclusively in terms of 
                                                        
107 See above n 42. 
108 Brady v Brady, above n 58, 552.   
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shareholder interests [emphasis added].’110 On this view, the interests of shareholders 
can remain justifiably unsatisfied or prejudiced by the directors if this is reasonably 
required in the interests of the company’s particular line of business.  Accordingly, for 
example, the board is required to avoid actions such as trimming labour costs, 
economising on health and safety matters that can put the workforce and the 
community in danger, the delaying of the payment of creditors and gambling with the 
company’s fortunes, which can entail correspondingly negative implications for 
corporate financial performance, just to pay a higher dividend and/or to justify a 
higher share price unaligned to corporate benefit.  Above all else, safeguarding and 
expanding the company as a going concern never ceases to be a proper and necessary 
point of reference, to which any continuing interests of the actual shareholders, or 
non-shareholder corporate constituencies, are divined from the commercial interests 
of the company as a going concern.  It is arguable that in doing this the common law 
formulation requires corporate boards, first and foremost, to ensure the business of 
entity exists on a continuing basis.   
 
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPANY LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP 
We explained above that section 172 of the 2006 Act restated the common law duty 
of good faith as a default mandatory rule to promote the company’s success for the 
exclusive benefit of shareholders. 111  This test for specifying the propriety of 
directorial conduct under the equitable fiduciary doctrine is apparently based on the 
common law heritage of regulating managerial discretion, which continues to be 
generally determinative of the interpretation and application of the codified duty.112 
The common good faith obligation was, it will be recalled, relatively simple: in all 
                                                        
110 Grantham, above n 4, 568.  See also, Sealy, above n 88, 270. 
111 See sources cited in nn 25-36 above (and accompanying text). 
112 See sources cited in nn 37-40 above (and accompanying text). 
 28 
areas, directors were expected to act in good faith in the ‘interests of the company’.  
However, if we consider the essential compatibility of the 2006 Act and common law 
position, the attempt at codification of the duty of good faith is a reminder that 
statutory drafting in novel circumstances sometimes involves the legislature in re-
writing important corporate legal rules, under the impression that it is following 
orthodox principles.  In particular, section 172 subordinates the company’s 
commercial interests to the interests of shareholders as a constituency.  Following 
Berle’s call for the company’s interests to be regarded along private-individualistic 
lines, the fact that the English common law has never directly affirmed such an 
understanding has been increasingly ignored within academic or law-making circles. 
Today, appropriate weight to this free-floating commercial interest is disappearing.  
Without it, there is the risk that the company’s ability to preserve or invest resources 
and capital in long-term projects and to generate value is weakened.  This is the topic 
of separate papers, but in the context of an overview of the general problem a number 
of doctrinal and normative observations can be made. 
 
a. Doctrinal implications of a misstated corporate interest 
On a doctrinal level, a starting-point for our inquiry into this legal innovation is the 
inevitable question of whether an express focus on shareholder interests was self-
identified as a deliberate and consequential restatement of the law on directors’ 
general fiduciary duties.  Certainly, if the wording of the 2006 Act replaces the 
common law,113 but is to be interpreted and applied in light of those pre-existing 
duties,114 it would appear to create a presumption that the Company Law Review did 
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not envisage significant reformation of directors’ general duties.115 In this regard, the 
Company Law Review decided, relatively quickly, that the codified duty of good faith 
should retain, what was in its view, the apparent shareholder focus from the common 
law, and that the enlightened shareholder value formulation was merely taking the 
pre-existing common law duty and ‘making its true character’ more explicit in 
statute.116 As well, the UK government stated explicitly during the passage of the 
legislation that the codified duties simply ‘clarified’ rather than amended the common 
law. 117  Yet on the present state of the evidence, although the codified duty’s 
narrowing of focus on the collective interests of shareholders was regarded as a 
conscious and rather banal political choice, it arguably lays down rules that are legal 
rules in their own right, based independently of the common law, and challenges the 
formerly orthodox judicial articulation of the ‘interests of the company’.   
 
No doubt, regardless of whether the corporate interest at common law is closely 
identified with the commercial interests of the company’s particular business, or a 
much more specific obligation to consider and protect the general body of 
shareholders, the continuing relevance of a subjective good faith review standard is, 
in practice, likely to result in the same undemanding judicial test for determining 
conformance with the legal duty.118 However, while there is much in the codified duty 
that is clearer and more authoritative, taken too literally, the restated conduct standard 
that is expected of directors is a significant doctrinal concern for two principal 
reasons.  First and foremost, this is considered to be the case, in particular, in the 
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limited range of post-2006 decisions involving section 172 (outside of derivative 
action proceedings), which have failed to approach statutory interpretation in a 
purposive and complete way in respect to the question of what was the proper 
common law reasoning of the corporate interest.  Instead, the courts have preferred to 
accept the unanalysed assumption that the interests of the general body of 
shareholders were the company’s interests.119 Contrary to popular thought on the 
codified duties, 120  an important, though undesirable, effect of the continuing 
misstatement of the common law articulation of the corporate interest might be the 
recognition of an as yet incompletely conceptualised conduct standard change.  To the 
extent this view is correct, the failure to provide adequate guidance on the general law 
could misdirect directors when deploying corporate power to carry out of their 
functions.  For example, in the areas of apportioning surplus funds121 or corporate 
acquisitions and restructurings, 122  if not in others, there are, in the entity-first 
understanding of the corporate interest, many options available to directors that will 
permit the company’s particular business to flourish and to sustain it.  In contrast, it 
would seem that a board is expected under section 172 to consider and protect the 
corporate entity’s assets and capital as merely a procedural means towards the 
ultimate end of enhancing shareholder value, which, itself, is neither the equivalent of 
entity prosperity and longevity nor a reasonable proxy for business value.123  
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Second, since the late-1970s and early 1980s, with the convergence of global 
financial deregulation and new information technologies, capital markets have been 
transformed.  In this area, the contentious label of ‘globalisation’ seems appropriate, 
not least because electronic trading has created truly global financial markets that are 
able to move instantaneously enormous amounts of money around the world.   In this 
process, the international trade in shares has also escalated.  These developments have 
led to a significant change in ownership distribution and complementary changes in 
corporate governance.  Due to the increasing use of financial intermediaries,124 which 
generate ‘investment chains’ between the shareholder (or, more aptly, the ‘beneficial 
owner’ of shares) and the UK companies they invest, modern share ownership is 
typically far less direct and increasingly ambiguous than it was fifty years ago.125 
Properly understood, actual and potential intermediaries, and beneficial owners, might 
each have different priorities or interests in any given strategic action before the 
board.  Of course, intermediation has both good and bad aspects, which have been 
discussed elsewhere. 126  For us, in spite of its purported attempt to ‘enlighten’ 
corporate boards, 127  the restatement of the entity-first corporate interest as a 
shareholder-first interest, perhaps counter-intuitively, generates a reductive 
shareholder agenda that is not free from ambiguity and tension in the modern 
corporate legal landscape.  As Eric Orts has remarked, ‘shareholders have different 
time and risk preferences that managers must somehow factor together, if they are to 
                                                        
124 On the main types of institutional shareholder likely seen in UK public companies, see J. Kay, The 
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represent fairly the artificially unified interests of “the shareholders” in general.’128 As 
reformulated, it is plainly arguable, therefore, that a good faith rule, which ensures 
that, when directors exercise discretionary power, they use company assets and 
resources only for the benefit of an apparently mythical shareholder interest in share 
value, seems practically misconceived, if not indeed in some sense conceptually 
impossible.   
 
b. Normative implications of a misstated corporate interest 
On a normative level, this account of specifying the ultimate corporate objective 
explicitly in terms of promoting the company’s success for the exclusive benefit of its 
shareholders as a constituency would not be complete without a brief comment about 
the possible normative effects of a mistaken assumption that shareholder interests are 
the company’s interests.  No doubt, there are powerfully influential deontological129 
and consequentialist130 arguments to explain or encourage increasing share value as 
the default and exclusive objective of company law.131 It is fair to say that most are, in 
some way, informed by the economic managerial ‘agency’ problem in company law, 
and the pronounced distrust of directors’ discretionary administrative authority.132 In 
this regard, it is perhaps entirely understandable that the protection of shareholders, 
and the control of shareholders over management have been previously described as 
‘the vital corporate problems’ of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.133 Of course, 
the fact that directors exclusively represent shareholder interests does not necessarily, 
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at the same time, mean consistently acting partially and to the detriment of the 
company’s profitable and sustainable business.  Specifying, when a commercial 
company is formed for the basis of making profits, as mentioned above, at some point 
of financial stability its continuing interests in the business flourishing usually 
coincide with that of its shareholders.  However, even if the corporate entity’s interest 
in growth and prosperity and shareholder interest in share value is, in many cases, 
aligned, sometimes they are not.  In this regard, the normative arguments against the 
shareholder value approach are a cause for concern.  The analysis below provides 
merely a flavour of its weaknesses.   
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is difficult to measure and empirically test a link between 
the idea that shareholders might prefer short-term value maximisation and the 
negative economic downside for companies, investors, and the economy.134 Against 
this backdrop, the concerns about short-termism might seem exaggerated. 135 
However, there remains an on-going and significant furore in academic 136  and 
business circles137 that the possibility of a causal connection must be taken seriously.  
While logically a mistaken assumption about the corporate interest, which prioritises 
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collective shareholder interests, should not necessarily generate short-termism, as 
Andrew Keay notes, ‘with a concomitant fixation on the quarterly earnings of 
companies and their share value, in practice this has often occurred.’138 Indeed, Moore 
and Arnott observe that the pressure to keep share price high has often driven public 
companies to adopt strategies that ultimately undervalue long-term profit 
opportunities, to sell vital assets for short-term effect on a company’s periodic 
revenue or cost profile, to cut back on product support and on research and 
development, or taking on excessive risks and excessive leverage.139 Recently, the 
unhealthy focus on short-termism was a point made by the then Business, Innovation, 
and Skills business select committee members in their review of Kraft’s takeover of 
Cadbury.  Most interesting is the committee’s criticism of the takeover process in the 
UK and the fact that Cadbury’s fate was ‘ultimately decided by institutional investors 
motivated by short-term profits rather than those investors who had the company’s 
long-term interests at heart.’140  
 
Other critics, meanwhile, might be inclined to think that Parliament is entitled to 
command the courts to change the rules, even retrospectively, but Parliament should 
not make the common law different from what the judges say it is any more than it 
can alter a historical fact.141 Of central importance in this regard is the fact that the 
effects of a mistaken assumption about interest expectation contributes to a 
contentious exclusive shareholder agenda, which is, it must be said, very limited in its 
focus.  Although it is often viewed as a normatively appropriate basis for evaluating 
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the efficiency of company law, 142  this is an empirically contestable common 
assumption, 143  not least because a focus on shareholder value risks legitimising 
managerial behaviour that may ultimately destroy business value. 144  The recent 
corporate failures of RBS and Carillion provide examples of shareholder value 
driving corporate boards to concentrate on increasing revenue, profits, assets, and 
leverage, rather than on the corporate interest of capital growth, liquidity, and asset 
quality.  Indeed, within a year prior to collapse both companies hiked their dividend 
in spite of revealing bad debts and/or selling assets to fill the dividend gap.145 This 
shareholder value approach is also problematic in that directors might choose to 
pursue inefficient or high-risk investment practices where the company is close to 
falling into an insolvent position from which it cannot escape.146 In such situations, 
shareholders will probably prefer that directors not invest in certain projects with 
positive net present value because the net present value generated by these projects, 
though positive, will not produce optimal (or at least sufficiently high) benefits that 
will go to shareholders, who are secondary to creditors when it comes to distribution 
                                                        
142 For discussions of maximising share value as efficient, see Easterbrook and Fischel, above n 6, 38; 
M. Lipton and S. A. Rosenblum, ‘A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election 
of Directors’ (1991) 58 University of Chicago Law Review 187, 203-205; J. H. Matheson and A. Olsen 
‘Corporate Law and the Long-term Shareholder Model of Corporate Governance’ (1992) 76 Minnesota 
Law Review 1313, 1329. 
143 Fisch, above n 123, 644; E. Elhauge, ‘Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest’ (2005) 
80 New York University Law Review 733, 776; T. A. Smith, ‘The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: 
A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty’ (1999) 98 Michigan Law Review 214, 221-225; J. 
Coffee, ‘Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web?’ (1986) 85 Michigan Law 
Review 1, 91. 
144 See e.g., C. O’Kelly, ‘History Begins: Shareholder Value, Accountability and the Virtuous State’ 
(2009) 60 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 35, 49; W. W. Bratton, ‘Enron and the Darker Side of 
Shareholder Value’ (2002) 76 Tulane Law Review 1275, 1284. 
145 See e.g. J. Plimmer and J. Ford, ‘Carillion ran up debts and sold assets to fill £217m dividend gap’ 
Financial Times (London, 26 January 2018) <https://www.ft.com/content/f5bbf3a2-01e0-11e8-9650-
9c0ad2d7c5b5>; Stephen Seawright, ‘RBS Raises Payout after Profit Growth’ The Telegraph (London, 
1 March 2007) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2805052/RBS-raises-payout-after-profit-
growth.html> accessed 4 April 2019.   
146  M. Jensen and W. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
 36 
of the company’s funds.147 In such a scenario, the shareholders might prefer to “roll 
the dice” with the company’s fortunes for they have nothing to lose.148 This approach 
is, it must be said, incompatible and antagonistic to the entity-first corporate interest 
that was articulated by the common law.   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This article examined the operational capacity of an important principle of company 
law, which is central the test for determining the propriety of directors’ exercise of 
corporate power under the equitable fiduciary doctrine.  In particular, it analysed the 
common law duty of good faith, which remains practically significant in interpreting 
and clarifying the content of the attempted codification set forth in section 172 of the 
2006 Act.  While the statutory duty restates the judicially determined test of acting in 
the ‘interests of the company’ as an express requirement to promote the success of the 
company for the exclusive benefit of shareholders, the path of the common law took a 
different approach in respect to interpreting this expression.  In closer inspection to 
the limited range of pre-2006 cases directly addressing the ultimate objective of 
companies, three salient and authoritative points emerge.  First, there were no 
appropriate circumstances in which the directors might legitimately advance the 
interest of shareholders or, for that matter, any other groups or entities involved in 
corporate activities.  No doubt, it might be inferred that shareholder sovereign control 
of the nature and extent of directorial authority silently structures the cases.  Yet the 
corporate interest does not ultimately come down to a reductive ‘maximisation of 
shareholder value’ instruction.  Second, and contrarily, common law reasoning about 
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the corporate interest evidently informs a more functional and nuanced 
conceptualisation of the company as an autonomous commercial entity, to which 
directors must advance the prosperity and continuing survival of its particular 
business objects.  Any benefits for shareholders flow from that very object.  Third, 
Parliament and the common law’s encounter with the good faith obligation might be 
framed, as this article submits, as antagonistic alternatives, or mutually exclusive 
directions of travel, rather than understood as a single coherent, integral body of law.  
Instead of assisting us in assessing the propriety of managerial conduct, the 
interaction between common law and statute law with respect to the pivotal role 
played by the good faith doctrine is likely to require cautious and coherent 
development in the case law in the absence of further legislative reform.   
